The mind–body problem remains a foundational unresolved issue at the intersection of philosophy of mind and cognitive science. While contemporary research on hemispheric asymmetry has produced extensive accounts of neural specialization and functional localization, it offers limited explanatory resources for understanding how lateralized neural dynamics are lived, enacted, and stabilized as embodied patterns of behavior. In prevailing frameworks, bodily asymmetry is often treated either as an epiphenomenal by-product of cognition or as a static anatomical correspondence, leaving unresolved the conceptual gap between neural processes, phenomenological orientation, and observable bodily action.This manuscript presents Subjectica, a theoretical neurophenomenological model that reconceptualizes hemispheric asymmetry as a dynamic mode of embodied sense-making rather than as a fixed neural or anatomical property. The model approaches lateralization as a continuous sensorimotor organization through which cognitive stance—understood as a situated orientation of experience and action—is enacted and maintained. From this perspective, bodily kinematics, posture, and segmental motor organization are not secondary expressions of cognition but constitutive dimensions of how cognitive orientation is realized in the world.The framework introduces four interrelated conceptual constructs: Personal-Oriented Left Side (PO-LS), Society-Oriented Right Side (SO-RS), the Asymmetric Neurobehavioral Signal (ANS), and Body Segments (BS). These constructs function as phenomenologically constrained interpretative operators that mediate between hemispheric functional asymmetry, lived orientation, and structured bodily dynamics. Rather than proposing deterministic mappings, the model articulates probabilistic and relational patterns through which lateralized cognitive orientations become embodied and behaviorally organized.Subjectica is proposed as a generative philosophical framework that clarifies the status of bodily asymmetry in theories of embodied cognition and neurophenomenology. Its primary contribution lies in specifying conceptual constraints and interpretative structures that enable future empirical operationalization, without reducing phenomenological orientation to either neural localization or purely behavioral description.